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Notes on Not Knowing:  











The essential premise of #MeToo is that, while large numbers of women are subject to sexual 
harassment and assault, this reality is not known to or understood by unnamed others. This 
article interrogates the subject of non-knowing #MeToo points to but does not name, asking: 
who exactly does not know, and why? These questions provide the starting point to elaborate the 
concept of male ignorance. While this lexicon has been fleetingly deployed in canonical feminist 
works – where it denotes something so obvious that is does not require explanation, functioning 
instead as a kind of feminist common sense – I develop it here so it might be put to greater use 
as a dedicated analytic. The work of Charles Mills, particularly his writings on white ignorance, 
provides a critical precedent in this regard. Following Mills in foregrounding the ideological 
operations of not knowing, I conceive male ignorance as a structure of concerted if unconscious 
epistemic occlusion which both stems from and serves to protect male privilege. As such, it plays 
a crucial role in securing the overall relation of domination and oppression within which 
gendered lives are lived. While male ignorance is itself multiple and has a variety of 
stakeholders, I argue that the non-knowing that surrounds sexual harassment and assault – 
which #MeToo draws attention to and seeks to undo – constitutes a paradigmatic manifestation, 
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#MeToo as epistemic intervention  
 
In the now familiar narrative, the viral phenomenon that became #MeToo began with a tweet 
from Hollywood actress Alyssa Milano:  
  
Me Too. 
Suggested by a friend: ‘If all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted 
wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the 
problem.’ (@AlyssaMilano, 2017)  
 
With this post — made after allegations against film producer Harvey Weinstein became public 
— Milano called on women at large to share their experiences of harassment and assault in order 
to demonstrate the scale of the issue to the general public. The express purpose was to expose 
and thereby educate; in attempting to make the statement ‘Me too’ go viral online, Milano set 
out to prove the existence of an offline epidemic. Embedded in her tweet is an assertion that 
while many if not most women have been subject to sexual harassment and assault, this reality 
is not known to or understood by unnamed others. At its most basic, then, #MeToo can be read 
as an attempt to make a problem known among those who do not know.  
 
Feminist academics have produced voluble commentary on #MeToo, encompassing numerous 
editorials, interviews and articles, alongside several monographs and edited collections. The 
general tenor of Anglophone literature is one of pronounced ambivalence, exhilaration mixing 
uneasily with disquietude, excitement continually tempered by discontent. While there is a 
general embrace of the fact that #MeToo has put sexual harassment and assault on the collective 
agenda, there is a great deal of unease about how this has been achieved, for whom, at what cost, 
and with what implications. Many of these concerns reflect long-standing tensions among 
feminists alongside newer frustrations occasioned by the recent embrace of ‘popular feminism’ 
(Banet-Weiser, 2018). Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, they include the vexed 
question of #MeToo’s ‘doubled origin’ (Cherniavsky, 2019: 16) and the erasure of ‘Me, Too’ 
originator Tarana Burke from the mainstream narrative (Nathaniel, 2019); the centring of white 
women within the movement and in its wider representation (Tambe, 2018), leading to charges 
of ‘political whiteness’ (Phipps, 2019); the reproduction of a ‘binary and fatalistic story’ of sexual 
violence in which sexual oppression is presented as the singular cause of gender oppression 
(Hemmings, 2018: 971); the tendency to elide the structural and economic dynamics and 
thereby render ‘poor and immigrant women, as well as women of colour, even more precarious 
and invisible than they already are’ (Rottenberg, 2019: 42).  
  
Despite these and other well-grounded concerns, #MeToo inspires feminist optimism and 
attachment. Existing literature pertaining to North America and Europe is replete with claims 
about the newness of this moment, in which women are apparently listened to and believed. 
Karen Boyle states the case simply when she contends: ‘Arguably, what makes the #MeToo 
moment distinct is less the speaking out – which women have been doing for decades … but 
rather the extent to which some of these stories have been widely heard’ (2019: 5). Striking a 
more effusive note, the late Ann Snitow opens her commentary in Dissent with the following 
remarks: ‘First off, and above everything else: for a feminist activist like me, after forty-five 
years, #Metoo is simply marvelous: “We believe the women!”’ (2018: 88). In an editorial 
exchange for European Journal of Women’s Studies, Dubravka Zarkov underscores the 
historical novelty of this situation by contrasting past media hostility towards women making 
accusations against high-profile men with the broad support shown to those coming forward 
now: ‘Today, we see the opposite: media seem to believe the accusers, fully and unconditionally 
– precisely what feminists hoped for since the 1970s!’ (Zarkov and Davis, 2018: 5). Kyoo Lee and 
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Jamieson Webster also position #MeToo as inaugurating a new era, where ‘we, as a society, 
lend, for the first time, to women’s voices a note of seriousness and consequence without 
requiring justification or cross-examination’ (2018: 252). Elsewhere, Ashwini Tambe writes: ‘In 
an important way, the ground beneath us has shifted. #MeToo has tilted public sympathy in 
favor of survivors by changing the default response to belief, rather than suspicion’ (2018: 198).  
  
Such comments are generally made in the context of nuanced analyses where the authors’ mixed 
feelings are readily apparent; indeed, many of those cited above espouse precisely the concerns 
already enumerated. Nevertheless, it is striking how often and emphatically claims are made 
about advances already achieved, with many seeming to believe that #MeToo marks a true 
cultural watershed and social sea change. This article sets out from a rather less optimistic 
perspective, seeded by a suspicion that #MeToo may not be quite such a novel moment or have 
such far-reaching effects as often seems to be assumed. Rather than critique #MeToo itself, 
however, or attempt to somehow measure its impact, I want to examine more closely the non-
knowing Milano’s invitatory tweet highlights and from which the hashtag proceeds. #MeToo 
thus serves as the starting point for – rather than the ultimate object of – an analysis that asks: 
Who, exactly, does not know? Who is unaware of the endemic levels of sexual harassment and 
assault women are subject to in the many societies where #MeToo has been taken up? Who is 
spared this knowledge? Who does not need it, or is able to proceed in life under the belief that 
they do not need it? What is it that keeps some people from apprehending this reality, when 
others are all too aware, indeed have no choice but to be aware?  
  
In what follows, I consider the operations of a gendered yet generalised non-knowing I propose 
to label male ignorance. While this concept does not appear to have any particular traction in 
existing feminist literature – database searches return only scattered results – it can be found in 
earlier works, including some canonical texts. Audre Lorde, for example, utilises this language in 
‘The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House’ when she writes: “Women of 
today are still being called upon to stretch across the gap of male ignorance and to educate men 
as to our existence and our needs” (1984: 113). Though Lorde deploys the term in passing, her 
usage implies that it gets at something quite central to feminist concerns; it is this non-knowing 
that women are so often tasked with traversing so that men may understand the basis of 
feminist complaint, and which women of colour are additionally beseeched to bridge for the 
benefit of white women. While not using the language of male ignorance expressly, Marilyn Frye 
addresses a similar dynamic when writing about ‘the problem that has no name’, a problem she 
argues — contra Friedan — is necessarily ‘about men, not about women’ (1983: 42). Describing 
how men interact with women without taking on their perspectives or concerns, and while 
seeming to remain unaware that this is the case, Frye writes: ‘The frustration of trying to 
function as a person in interaction with someone who is exercising this kind of control over 
others and over his own perceptions, and is not acknowledging it, is one of the primary sources 
of feminist rage’ (1983: 48). 
  
My argument proceeds in two parts. First, I introduce the work of political philosopher Charles 
Mills, who raises the possibility of male ignorance being taken up as a kind of gendered corollary 
to his own writings on white ignorance. Adopting some of the conceptual scaffolding his analysis 
affords, I begin to flesh out the concept of male ignorance and delineate its relationship with the 
social category ‘men’. In a second section I consider how the non-knowing that surrounds sexual 
harassment and assault constitutes a key example of male ignorance. Crucial in this regard is the 
manner in which male ignorance both stems from and serves to protect male privilege and 
entitlement, including that of sexual access to women’s bodies. I conclude by reflecting on what 
this analysis might entail in assessing #MeToo and other struggles against sexual violence, and 
offer some thoughts about how the concept of male ignorance might – and might not – be put to 
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work in feminist theory more broadly. Overall, the purpose of this paper is to elucidate one 
particular aspect of the ‘attitudinal-conceptual-cognitive-orientational complex’ (Frye, 1983: 41) 
that sustains gender inequality and oppression. While drawing heavily on scholarship from 
within philosophy, it contributes to a lineage of feminist theoretical and empirical work 
concerned with the psychic dimensions of sexual politics, and with it ‘the reproduction of the 
social in the psychological’ (Wetherell and Edley, 1999: 354).  
 
Before proceeding I must make clear that, even as #MeToo is not the focus of this analysis, my 
intention is not to question its value as a space to share or make sense of painful experiences. As 
a ‘collective chorus’ (Rodríguez, 2019: 121) and ‘movement of mass disclosure’ (Phipps, 2019: 2), 
#MeToo clearly provided a much-needed forum for the ‘performance of mutual recognition’ 
(Jackson, 2018: 5), allowing social media users to articulate individual injury and amplify 
collective grievance while opening out new modes of mediated consciousness-raising and peer-
to-peer support (Hosterman et al., 2018; Jackson et al., 2019; Mendes et al., 2018). I must also 
state that where Milano’s tweet positions women as the sole or special subjects of sexual harm — 
a focus largely retained in the wider #MeToo narrative (Halberstam, 2017)1 — I take it for 
granted, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, that while women are disproportionately 
subject to sexualised harm in many parts of the world, women are not exclusively vulnerable or 
inherently violable. That is to say, the reality of sexual violence — which is both gendered and 
gendering — is contextual and contingent, not essential or universal (Helliwell, 2000). 
Relatedly, while I retain the formulation of ‘sexual harassment and assault’ used by Milano, I do 
so with an awareness that although #MeToo has usefully illuminated the continuum of sexual 
violence (Kelly, 1988), this has often meant collapsing different forms of harm and delimiting 
available horizons of redress (Burgess, 2018; Rodríguez, 2019; Wanzo, 2019). I also deliberately 
refer to sexual harassment and assault as ‘practices’ in order to foreground their status as acts 




Feminist epistemology has long been interested in the relationship between knowledge and 
power. Feminist standpoint theory (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991; Hill Collins, 1986) has been 
especially influential in its contention that those marginalised by or subordinated within 
dominant structures of power are often positioned in ways that allow them to both know more 
and to know more accurately. While this would seem to necessarily raise questions about non-
knowing and the role this might play in facilitating relations of domination and oppression, 
feminists have paid rather less attention to ignorance, despite the fact that ‘we cannot fully 
understand the complex practices of knowledge production and the variety of features that 
account for why something is known, without also understanding the practices that account for 
not knowing’ (Tuana and Sullivan, 2006: np). Nevertheless, feminist thinking may alert us to 
the ways in which ignorance, far from being coterminous with a lack of social power, can 
actually result from and serve as a vehicle for its instantiation. As Eve Sedgwick writes in 
Epistemology of the Closet: ‘ignorance is as potent and as multiple a thing as knowledge. 
Knowledge, after all, is not itself power, although it is the magnetic field of power. Ignorance 
and opacity collude or compete with knowledge in mobilising the flows of energy, desire, goods, 
meanings, persons’ (1990, 4).  
  
Building on ideas first set out in his milestone text The Racial Contract (1997), in a 2007 essay 
titled ‘White Ignorance’ Charles Mills pursues ‘the idea of an ignorance, a non-knowing, that is 
not contingent, but in which race – white racism and/or white racial domination and their 
ramifications – plays a crucial causal role’ (2007: 20). Mills is concerned not with simple gaps in 
or absences of knowledge, but rather more obdurate opacities. His argument builds on but goes 
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beyond scholarship on situated knowledge and social location (Code, 1995; Haraway, 1988; 
Harding, 1991), positing a more thoroughly structural account (Alcoff, 2007). White ignorance, 
for Mills, is not just a product of experience — as standpoint theory might suggest — but a 
necessary mechanism of white supremacy. It has a material as well as phenomenological basis, 
in which white group interests play a coordinating role. As such, white ignorance is not 
incidental or immutable, but intensely ideological. As part of his exposition, Mills notes: ‘it 
presumably does not need to be emphasized that white ignorance is not the only kind of 
privileged, group-based ignorance’ (2007: 22), immediately going on to propose: ‘Male 
ignorance could be analyzed similarly and clearly has a far more ancient history and arguably a 
more deep-rooted ancestry in human interrelations, insofar as it goes back thousands of years’ 
(2007: 22). Mills does not expand on these comments in that essay or advance the concept 
elsewhere. Instead, male ignorance remains a conceptual proposition, which others are 
implicitly invited to furnish further.  
  
I can admit a certain trepidation in proposing to take up this language. To begin with, and 
despite the fact that Mills himself offers the analogy, I do not want to imply an equivalence 
between race and gender, which must be understood as distinctive yet interrelated systems 
whose operations are ‘sometimes parallel and sometimes interlocking’ (Hill Collins, 2017: 260). 
Focussing on gendered non-knowing specifically – in a manner broadly concordant with Mills’ 
concern with racialised non-knowing – additionally risks pursuing a single-axis framework that 
many will find unsatisfying. A further source of unease pertains to the use of the word ‘male’, 
specifically on account of its valence within certain strands of feminist theory. As Angela 
McRobbie notes, concepts such as ‘masculine dominance’ and ‘male power’ have become passé 
among feminists and gender theorists alike, regarded as ‘too crude, possibly essentialist, and 
theoretically unviable “after” queer theory’ (2009: 17). While scholars including Imani Perry 
(2018) and Kate Manne (2018) have recently sought to revivify the decidedly ‘“old” categories’ 
(McRobbie, 2009: 17) of patriarchy and misogyny in their respective work, this does not in itself 
signal a wholesale reversal of the long-standing malaise such concepts have invoked. The term 
‘male’ is also complicated by developments in trans thinking and theorising, which further 
underscore the indeterminacy of supposedly biological categories and collapse any remaining 
distinction that might inhere between sex and gender (Enke, 2012). At the same time, some of 
this work could be seen to make such categories available for new avenues of feminist enquiry, 
precisely because they untether them so completely from corporeal morphology – as seen, for 
example, with Andrea Long Chu’s Females (2019). 
  
Despite these qualms, I find the language of male ignorance compelling. To my mind – and as 
its invocation by such a pre-eminent figure as Lorde suggests – it helps illuminate a dynamic 
well-known to feminists but not expressly addressed in existing literature. It seems especially 
apt in trying to gain a greater handle on the epistemic gap #MeToo points to and aims to 
redress, as I come on to further below. My interest in the formulation Mills develops arises not 
simply from the conceptual corollary he invokes, but rather the ideological framing he proposes. 
For Mills, white ignorance is in no way essential or ahistorical but instead emerges in and 
through the modern construction of race and, with it, the elaboration of distinct experiences as 
well as interests among racialised groups. It is closely imbricated with but not reducible to 
racism on the part of individuals, stemming instead from ‘both straightforward racist motivation 
and more impersonal social-structural causation, which may be operative even if the cogniser in 
question is not racist’ (Mills, 2007: 21). In utilising the language of male ignorance, then, I mean 
to describe patterns of non-knowing that are structured by and which give structure to gender as 
a system of enforced binaries and imposed hierarchies. It stems from the collective interest men 
have in maintaining male power and privilege, whether or not this is known to or acknowledged 
by individual men. While likely pertaining to those who could be regarded as sexist or 
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misogynist, male ignorance is in no way limited to patriarchy’s most ardent defenders or faithful 
foot-soldiers. Rather, it is a product of and prescription for gendered inequalities and 
oppressions on a much wider plane.  
  
Given the discomfort any too straightforward linking of ‘male’ and ‘men’ is liable to occasion 
among feminists, it is worth sketching their relation further via Mills’ own very careful 
delineation of the relationship between white ignorance and white people. Crucial here is his 
insight that white ignorance is neither restricted to nor uniform among whites. With regard the 
former, Mills argues that white ignorance ‘will often be shared by nonwhites to a greater or 
lesser extent because of the power relations and patterns of ideological hegemony involved’ 
(2007: 22); thus for Mills it is possible to speak of ‘black “white” ignorance’ (2013: 41). Similarly, 
I see no reason to think male ignorance is or should be limited to those who actively identify or 
are otherwise positioned as male. Indeed, a great deal of feminist scholarship attests to women’s 
collusion with and investment in oppressive gender regimes, eloquently captured by Deniz 
Kandiyoti’s idea of ‘bargaining with patriarchy’ (1988). Precisely because white ignorance and 
male ignorance are ideological non-knowings, at least some of those who are disadvantaged and 
even disarticulated by these systems will buy into them. Furthermore, where white ignorance is 
understood as ‘a cognitive tendency — an inclination, a doxastic disposition — which is not 
insuperable’ (Mills, 2007: 23), it stands to reason that this propensity can be overcome by those 
who inherit it. Likewise, it seems fair to suggest that at least some men can and do move beyond 
the bounds of their own ignorance; the more pertinent question for feminists is how and why. 
  
Turning to the latter half of this proviso, Mills contends that ‘speaking generally about white 
ignorance does not commit one to the claim that it is uniform across the white population’ 
(2007: 22). For Mills, the need to account for other kinds of social difference is or should be self-
evident: ‘if the analysis of white ignorance is to be part of a social epistemology, then the obvious 
needs to be remembered – that people have other identities besides racial ones, so that whites 
will be divisible by class, gender, nationality, religion, and so forth’ (2007: 23). Like Mills, I 
believe group interests play a key role in sustaining structural ignorance, precisely because of 
the advantages this can confer. Of course, the benefits accorded to men by virtue of their sex or 
gender have never been evenly apportioned, but are instead unequally distributed via their 
coincidence with other vectors of social power; indeed, this is a founding premise of men and 
masculinity studies (Carrigan et al., 1985). Grappling with similar issues, Mills argues that 
despite the inequalities that inhere among whites, the ‘wages of whiteness’ (Roediger, 1991 
(1999)) nevertheless constitute ‘a major factor in encouraging white cognitive distortions of 
various kinds’ (2007: 35). In a related manner, while acknowledging hierarchies and divisions 
among men – shaped by long and enduring histories of racism, colonialism, and class 
exploitation, among other things – the conception of male ignorance I am arguing for here takes 
seriously the workings of the ‘patriarchal dividend’. This, as Raewyn Connell argues, is ‘the main 
stake in contemporary gender politics. Its scale makes patriarchy worth defending’ (2002: 143). 
Even as their own claims may go unrealised, and despite the fact that it often exacts its own 
costs, all men stand to benefit from this pay-out.  
 
In pursuing this line of analysis – one that admittedly privileges gender among other axes of 
oppression – my intention is not to elide the intersectional workings of male ignorance, but 
rather to suggest that these must be anticipated and explored rather than assumed in advance. 
My thinking here is informed by Anna Carastathis’ conception of intersectionality as a 
provisional concept, a point of departure rather than of arrival (2014). While it would, perhaps, 
be easy to assume that different forms of structural non-knowing necessarily operate in concert 
and compound one another, to make such an assumption a priori would be neglect the complex 
and sometimes contradictory workings of intersectionality ‘on the ground’. It may well be the 
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case that white and male ignorance, for example, enable and entrench one another; indeed, 
given the long-standing interconnections between white supremacy and patriarchy, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that they are liable to do so. To leave the argument there, however, would 
be to neglect the operations of ‘race and gender as social processes that inform each other, but 
which operate in distinct and particular ways’ (Nash, 2008: 12). Thus it may also be the case 
that different forms of structural non-knowing can operate more or less independently, such 
that marginalisation along axes of oppression other than gender can give rise to particular 
investments in gendered non-knowing, or conspire to ensure that gendered non-knowing is not 
an option.2 Ultimately, my contention is that the intersectional workings of male ignorance need 
to be examined via specific instances of non-knowing, such as that which surrounds sexual 
violence – something I explore further below. Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind that 
structural non-knowings of all kinds can be uneven, pertaining in relation to certain settings or 
subjects but not others. 
  
My argument, then, is that there exists such a thing as male ignorance, a pattern of non-knowing 
that does not simply reflect the social location men occupy vis-à-vis women and other genders, 
but which actively instantiates gender inequality and oppression. It is not an incidental 
arrangement but rather an imperative condition, vital to securing the overall structure of 
domination and subordination within which gendered lives are lived. It serves a multiplicity of 
functions – crucially as psychic resource, but also as rhetorical manoeuvre and exculpatory 
device. Based in the collective interest men have in maintaining the various rights and 
entitlements the patriarchal dividend unevenly accords, male ignorance has an ideological 
rather than purely experiential base. Precisely because it is ideological, it is not unique to men in 
provenance or purveyance, nor it is endowed to equal extent among or exercised with equal 
effect by all men. Vectors of race, nation, religion, class, caste, sexuality and (dis)ability all shape 
its operation; and yet this is not to say that those who occupy marginalised social locations are 
somehow inured to its workings, nor that those with social power are necessarily among its most 
obvious exemplars. While part of the cognitive schema that maintains gendered domination and 
oppression, it is not the same as a conscious investment in patriarchy or male supremacy; 
instead it is a form of non-knowing that typically operates without the awareness of its 
inhabitants. Male ignorance actively resists change, continually insulating itself against possible 
threats and potential incursions — sometimes violently so.  
  
From here there arises the question of how or why the non-knowing that surrounds and 
supports sexual harassment and assault might be regarded as a prime instance of male 
ignorance. My contention is that not simply that knowledge of this kind is delimited or 
circumscribed in general, but that its distribution has gendered contours and implications. 
While experience and identification are manifestly important, I believe there is something more 
at stake here. I develop this line of thought in the next section by considering how male 
ignorance is imbricated with male privilege and entitlement, such that men have an interest in 
remaining actively unaware of sexual harassment and assault as problems that are both 
extremely pervasive and in which they are all too frequently implicated, directly and indirectly. 
In making this argument, I am primarily concerned with cisgender heterosexual men, not only 
on account of the particularities belonging to this category is liable to facilitate — in ways likely 
to differ for gay and trans men — but also because gendered social power is overwhelmingly 
allocated to and exercised by this group, today and historically and across a wide range of 
contexts. Furthermore, heterosexuality as an institution offers specific benefits to men, such that 




On not knowing  
 
In her work on epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker (2007) describes the workings of 
hermeneutical injustice, that is, the harm that arises when important aspects of our experience 
are obscured from collective understanding on account of structural identity prejudice. 
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a lack of shared interpretive resources with which 
marginalised or subordinated groups can communicate experiences it is very much in their 
interest to make intelligible to themselves and others. As such, oppressed groups are liable ‘to 
find themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting 
meanings to draw on in the effort to render them intelligible’ (Fricker, 2007: 148). Fricker cites 
sexual harassment as the central case of hermeneutical injustice, noting that, in English, this 
terminology only became available in the 1970s. Prior to this, ‘the absence of a proper 
understanding of what men were doing to women when they treated them like that was ex 
hypothesi quite general’ (Fricker, 2007: 151).  
 
Fricker makes clear that this linguistic and cognitive gap was not incidental. Rather, ‘the whole 
engine of collective social meaning was effectively geared to keeping these obscured experiences 
out of sight’ (Fricker, 2007: 153). As Debra Jackson, drawing on Fricker, explains:  
The phenomenon we now recognize as sexual harassment is highly gendered and 
differentially impacts men and women. The historical absence of this concept is 
determined by the parameters of existent rhetorical spaces. Women’s social 
subordination to men both produces and is reinforced by their unequal ability to 
participate in the shaping of dominant interpretive resources (2018: 10) 
The inability to name sexual harassment not only attests to gendered oppression, but actively 
instantiates it. Without a vocabulary to describe her experiences, the woman made to endure 
such practices is liable to be ‘left deeply troubled, confused, and isolated, not to mention 
vulnerable to continued harassment. Her hermeneutical disadvantage renders her unable to 
make sense of her ongoing mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from protesting it, let 
alone securing effective measures to stop it’ (Fricker, 2007: 151). By contrast, while the man who 
perpetrates sexual harassment may lack the language to name what he is doing, this is not to his 
disadvantage; rather, ‘there is an obvious sense in which it suits his purpose’ (Fricker, 2007: 
151).  
 
The coinage of the term sexual harassment was an important step in discerning the conditions 
that enabled it, as dynamics that were previously unnamed and unnameable became available 
for collective understanding. Of course, while the concept is now in widespread use, this is not to 
say its definition is agreed upon or its contents uncontested. Yet where Fricker’s concern is to 
illuminate how male structures of power can block women from knowing something important 
about their own experiences, mine is to discern how these same structures can block men from 
knowing something important about women’s experiences. Here it is helpful to consider more 
closely the relationship between ignorance and privilege. In The Epistemology of Resistance 
(2013), José Medina distinguishes between forms of non-knowing that issue from privilege and 
those required to preserve it. He writes:   
There is not needing to know and there is needing not to know. The cognitive 
predicament of the privileged involves, in some cases, a not needing to know that leads 
to epistemic laziness, but it also involves, in other cases, a needing not to know that 
creates blind spots of a different kind: not just areas of epistemic neglect, but areas of an 
intense but negative cognitive attention, areas of epistemic hiding — experiences, 
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perspectives, or aspects of social life that require an enormous amount of effort to be 
hidden and ignored. Ignorance in these cases functions as a defence mechanism that is 
used to preserve privilege (Medina, 2013: 34) 
Attention to both modes provides insight as to how and why cisgender heterosexual men very 
often remain insulated from knowledge about sexual harassment and assault, specifically as 
propagated by men against women. 
 
To begin, cis-het men have less need to know about sexual harassment and assault than do 
women simply because they are not its principle targets. This is not to say that cis-het men are 
not victim to such practices; clearly, they are. Rather, the point is simply that women are 
disproportionately subject to sexualised intrusion and abuse across a range of everyday spaces. 
As such, they are more likely to be familiar with – indeed, to know intimately – the insidious 
banality of these practices, their simultaneous to-be-expectedness and disorientating impact, 
their weathering force and enervating effects. Moreover, whatever the actual incidence of sexual 
harassment and assault, women are socialised to anticipate sexual threat and routinely enjoined 
to lead reduced lives by circumscribing themselves within the always-precarious bounds of 
‘safety’ (Vera-Gray, 2018).  Across a variety of domains in both the Global North and South, the 
fear of rape — the perceived threat of which often outstrips its statistical likelihood and 
frequently misattributes the source of danger — limits women’s engagement with public space 
and public life (Dosekun, 2013; Haskell and Randall, 1998; Pawson and Banks, 1993; Phadke et 
al., 2011; Silva and Wright, 2009; Stanko, 1995; Valentine, 1989). Whether or not it ultimately 
accords with their own lived experience, cis-het men are generally not socialised to anticipate 
sexual risk in the same way or to the same extent. That is to say, because they occupy a 
privileged position in gender relations, cis-het men have less need to know — or, at least, are led 
to believe they have less need to know — about sexual harassment and assault. As such, this 
knowledge does not typically impact or preoccupy them in the same way as it does those whose 
lives are shaped by both its spectre and actuality.3 
  
For Erinn Cunniff Gilson, the non-knowing that surrounds sexual violence rests upon a deeper 
denial of intersubjective vulnerability, that is, ‘our frailty, dependence, susceptibility, 
interrelatedness, and the contingency of our development’ (2015: 230). While social location 
may facilitate such ignorance — Gilson highlights ‘masculine gender identity’ as a possible 
contributing factor — it is undergirded by ‘an unconscious but active interest in denying the 
pervasiveness of rape, its causes, and the nature of the vulnerabilities at play’ (2015: 232). 
Ignorance of sexual violence is thus not simply a matter of experience or identification — 
actually being subject to it or envisioning it as a real possibility — but arises instead from a 
deeper will not to know. Such ignorance is highly gendered precisely because sexual 
vulnerability is coded feminine: ‘a specifically feminine and/or female form of vulnerability is 
assumed; that is, feminine/female vulnerability is not just susceptibility to any kind of harm but 
rather is viewed as particularly sexual vulnerability’ (Gilson, 2015: 233). Because of this, ‘it is 
believed that it is women, not men, who are vulnerable and almost inherently so’ (Gilson, 2015: 
233). This modality of ignorance is at the same time classed and racialised in ways that ‘obstruct 
recognition of the risk non-white and working class women face’ (Gilson, 2015: 233) and invest 
middle-class white women with ‘a sense of preciosity’ (Hall, 2004: 4 cited in Gilson, 2015: 233).  
 
Because the gendered coding of sexual vulnerability is frequently attended by a racialised coding 
of sexual threat – for example, via the ‘myth of the Black male rapist’ in the USA (Davis, 1982) 
or the ‘Muslim grooming gang’ in the UK (Tufall, 2015) – ignorance of sexual violence is 
potentially more available to some men than others. That is to say, it may be that some men 
cannot afford to not know about sexual harassment and assault, precisely because the spectre of 
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sexual violence is so often projected onto them. And yet, by the logic of Gilson’s argument, the 
desire to deny intersubjective vulnerability – including the threat of being falsely accused or 
otherwise unfairly implicated – may also lead those subordinated along lines of race, ethnicity, 
class and caste to all the more vigorously deny the realities of sexual harassment and violence 
both within and without their communities, as a matter of self-preservation. Indeed, scholarship 
by Black and postcolonial feminists attests to precisely this dynamic. Thus Kimberlé Crenshaw 
(1991) documents how Black communities in the USA may suppress knowledge of sexual 
violence in their midst in an effort to stem racist stereotypes and the violence they enable. 
Elsewhere, María Lugones (2016 [2008]) describes how colonialism encourages men of colour 
to become indifferent to the suffering of women of colour, as the coloniality of gender promises 
them a greater stake in patriarchal relations.4  
 
Ignorance, then, is one of the ways privilege operates: to not know, to not have to know, is itself 
a particular form of entitlement. But as Medina points out, ignorance is also a means of 
retaining privilege; there are some things that need to not be known in order for privilege to 
prevail. While of course ‘we all have things we would rather avoid: things that are hard to hear, 
things that are difficult to accept or even to acknowledge’ (Medina, 2013: 34), there also exist 
more concerted forms of non-knowing. Privilege in instrumental in orchestrating such epistemic 
‘close-mindedness’, as Medina terms it, entailing ‘an active effort not to see, no matter what the 
evidence may be’ (2013: 35). This is not to say that close-mindedness is conscious; rather, it is 
typically undergirded by a pattern of ‘socialization that leads one to be insensitive to certain 
things and immune to certain considerations’ (Medina, 2013: 36). Ignorance of this kind ‘can be 
very narrowly focused, targeting very specific experiences and perspectives that one’s mind 
becomes closed off to’, but more often entails ‘the lack of openness to a whole range (no matter 
how broad or narrow) of experiences and viewpoints that can destabilize (or create trouble for) 
one’s own perspective’ (Medina, 2013: 35, emphasis added).5 
  
This notion of troubling or troublesome knowledge is important when thinking about how and 
why cisgender heterosexual men might need not to know about sexual harassment and assault. 
In fundamental ways, this knowledge is threatening to cis-het men, as it throws the injustice of 
everyday gender relations into sharp relief. To confront the pervasiveness of sexual harassment 
and assault — the patterning of which is deeply gendered, even as it transverses other axes of 
oppression — means confronting the basic relation of domination and subordination within 
which gendered lives are lived. While for women such knowledge is imperative — in the sense of 
being unavoidable, even as it may not be useful — for many men it is perilous, jeopardising the 
various rights and entitlements the patriarchal dividend affords. Knowledge of this kind 
threatens to expose the insidiously intimate character of gendered domination and oppression. 
In this, male ignorance is liable to function somewhat differently than white ignorance. While 
informal segregation in domains such as education, employment and housing – as historically 
and currently pertains in a variety of contexts, including the USA and UK – can mean that white 
people have little direct interaction or close relationships with people of colour, women and men 
tend to live in immediate proximity, whether as partners, siblings, parents, children, friends and 
so on. In addition, although economic and social power are clearly at play in both white and 
male ignorance, the advantages men enjoy over and at the expense of women very often accrue 
most acutely in the private sphere, via assumed rights of physical and emotional access 
alongside claims on domestic and reproductive labour. As such, the will not to know may take 
on a particular character in relation to gender that may or may not apply in the context of race.6 
  
Writing about male supremacy and moral selfhood, Michael Schwalbe offers insight into the 
psychic function of not knowing. At issue for Schwalbe is the manner in which men come to ‘see 
women’s pain as less important than their own, to deny responsibility for it, and to refuse to see 
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as demanding for its alleviation any radical change on the part of men’ (1992: 44). While not 
couching his argument in the language of ignorance per se, he nevertheless points to a need not 
to know centred on the preservation of privilege: 
 
It is not just that male privilege disinclines men to engage in receptive role taking vis-a-
vis women. It is that, as with relinquishing control, this kind of role taking would 
threaten the survival of the masculinist self. This is a self premised not only on dis-
identifying with women, and on denying dependence upon them, but also on remaining 
insulated from their pain. If this pain were to be fully felt, its roots in the patterns of 
domination that sustain masculinist selves in other ways might become obvious. The 
pain men cause women would become men’s pain and men would be motivated to 
destroy the masculinist selves causing it. A suicidal dilemma is thus avoided by avoiding 
receptive role taking. An inevitable by-product is moral irresponsibility in action vis-a-
vis women (Schwalbe, 1992: 42) 
 
Schwalbe highlights sexual harassment as a key example of men’s ethical diminishment within 
male supremacy and the denialism this gives rise to. His analysis suggests that not knowing is 
part of what enables some men to perpetrate sexualised harassment and abuse, and further that 
it underlies a more general unwillingness among men to engage and empathise with women as 
relational subjects whose perspectives and experiences must be given equal weight to their own. 
Insofar as it serves to protect the gender and sexual status quo, then, male ignorance must be 
understood as motivated ignorance, operating in service to something that, for some, is very 
much worth protecting. 
  
Ignorance of sexual harassment and assault – and with it the routine havoc and enduring misery 
they so often entail – is especially crucial in safeguarding one of the patriarchal dividend’s chief 
affordances for heterosexual men: that of sexual entitlement. Such prerogative is underpinned 
by the male sexual ‘drive’ discourse (Hollway, 1984), which enshrines men’s supposed ‘need’ for 
sex. This and other heteronormative discourses license myriad forms of compulsion in the 
context of heterosexual encounters and relationships, the majority of which are chalked up to 
and passed off as ‘just sex’ (Gavey, 2005) by men and women alike. The ultimate result is to 
normalise women’s sexual acquiescence, as evidenced by the widespread phenomenon of 
technically-consensual-but-nevertheless-unwanted-sex (Bay-Cheng and Bruns, 2016; Burkett 
and Hamilton, 2012). Simply put, male sexual entitlement underwrites coercion as a normative 
facet of women’s sexual experience and social existence, including that of lesbian and queer 
women (Fahs, 2011). Knowledge about sexual harassment and assault — of just how prevalent 
these practices are, and of how deeply they can impact those subjected to them — thus poses a 
threat to the heteronormative order writ large, quite besides the fact that sexual harassment and 
assault are normative to this order rather than anomalies within or aberrations from it. If cis-het 
men were to take on this knowledge, to experience the pain it generates as their own, they would 
have to ask serious questions about their ethical conduct vis-à-vis women; moreover, the 
manner in which sexual relations between women and men are conducted generally would be 
open to question. By contrast, it is through not knowing — or claiming not to know — that men 
are able to enjoy this particular form of entitlement more or less unfettered.  
  
Precisely because ignorance licences entitlement, it also underwrites violation. Sedgwick points 
to this directly when she argues that:  
The epistemological asymmetry of the laws that govern rape, for instance, privileges at 
the same time men and ignorance, inasmuch as it matters not at all what the raped 
woman perceives or wants just so long as the man raping her can claim not to have 
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noticed (ignorance in which male sexuality receives careful education) (1990: 5)  
A wealth of feminist research attests to this ‘careful education’ in ignorance, with rape and 
sexual assault routinely figured as products of men’s ‘not knowing’ (O’Byrne, Hansen and 
Rapley, 2008). Such logics not only shape how men approach and negotiate sexual interactions 
with women, but also inform well-documented tendencies among women to downplay intrusion 
and abuse in an effort to ‘evade victimhood’ (Baker, 2010) and preserve an ‘illusory sense of 
control’ (Frith and Kitzinger, 1997) – while also avoiding what for many is the too-costly toll of 
trying to hold men accountable. My own research demonstrates how ignorance of sexual 
harassment and assault can be maintained even in sites dedicated to the production of 
knowledge about ‘female sexuality’, a conspicuous omission motivated by the collective interest 
of the men involved in this setting (O’Neill, 2018). The non-knowing that surrounds sexual 
harassment and assault is thus cultivated, curated, coordinated — and also contested. Indeed, 
the ‘orchestration of ignorance’ (Sedgwick, 1990: 5) is a key site of political struggle, one which 
#MeToo strikes at the heart of.   
 
Promises, propositions, problems, possibilities 
 
The implicit promise of #MeToo was that if the full scale of sexual harassment and assault could 
be demonstrated, this knowledge would go some way to ending the problem. This, in itself, is 
not such a new proposition. After all, the imperative to ‘speak out’ has been central to feminist 
efforts against sexual violence for decades. Excavating this history, Tanya Serisier describes how 
feminist anti-rape activism in 1970s USA sought to establish the ‘epistemological primacy and 
political power of women’s experiential knowledge around sexual violence’ (2018: 6). As a result, 
feminist anti-rape politics in and beyond the USA came to be ‘founded on the belief that 
producing and disseminating a genre of personal experiential narratives can end sexual violence’ 
(Serisier, 2018: 4). #MeToo reproduces this logic exactly, transposing the basic strategy to the 
digital realm and harnessing the network effects this affords. However, this and other feminist 
campaigns against sexual violence might also be read as having a more specific remit, albeit one 
that is not often expressly articulated. Sarah Jaffe gestures to this when she recalls: ‘When 
#MeToo began to circulate on Facebook I was beyond cynical; I was actually angry that the men 
around me might be shocked to learn that yes, it had happened to me, it had happened to almost 
every woman I know’ (2018: 80). Jaffe goes on to elucidate #MeToo’s ultimate aim: ‘It is a huge 
demand, perhaps unrealizable in our lifetimes, one that is bigger than any perpetrator outed in 
the media: It is not a demand for men to go to jail. It is a demand for men to do the work of 
learning’ (2018: 84, emphasis added). Understood in this light, the unspeakable promise of 
#MeToo was that if men could be made to know women’s pain, they would no longer propagate 
and procure it.  
  
While #MeToo has been heralded as ushering in an era in which women are, at last, believed, its 
ultimate impact remains unclear. As Kaitlynn Mendes and colleagues admit, ‘we still know very 
little about what hashtags like #MeToo actually do; or whether and how they produce social 
change’ (2018: 237). Empirical research on men’s engagement with #MeToo does not provide 
any particular grounds for optimism. In an online questionnaire involving respondents in the 
USA and Norway, researchers found that ‘men expressed less positivity toward #metoo than 
women and perceived it as substantially more harmful and less beneficial’, a finding they argue 
can be accounted for ‘by men being higher than women in hostile sexism, higher in rape myth 
acceptance, and lower in feminist identification’ (Kunst et al., 2018: 818). Notably for the 
argument I have made here, the authors take this to evidence ‘ideological differences rather than 
fundamental group differences’ (Kunst et al. 2018, 818). Another study, examining the 
#HowIWillChange hashtag – created by an Australian journalist as a way for men to document 
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how they planned to respond to #MeToo – charts three main usages: committing to change, 
which saw users promise to listen to and ‘protect’ women; indignant resistance, where users 
denied being implicated in the problem; and hostile resistance, where users claimed that no 
such problem exists, rejected the need for change, and attacked those who advocate it. 
Accounting for these findings, the researchers state: ‘it may be that men find it easier to 
externalize problematic behaviors contributing to rape culture to other people, rather than do a 
personal examination of how one benefits from and perpetuates rape culture themselves’ 
(PettyJohn et al., 2018: 620). They go on to explain that as a privileged social group men may 
seek to ‘remain ignorant’ (PettyJohn et al., 2018: 620, emphasis added), deploying distancing 
strategies so as to maintain a sense of morality without having to alter their own conduct.  
  
These findings, while certainly not the whole picture, broadly tally with the argument I have put 
forward regarding a deep and pervasive will not to know, a non-knowing in which cisgender 
heterosexual men have a particular stake. At the same time, it is important to highlight what 
research of this kind cannot capture; namely, apathy, indifference, disregard. While difficult to 
measure or assess, these variegated forms of non-response are crucial in tracking the import of 
#MeToo, precisely because ‘knowledge requires work and its acquisition will not happen 
without the active participation of the knower’ (Medina, 2013: 33–4). This is perhaps especially 
true in an era of communicative capitalism, the infrastructure of which is geared to produce ‘no 
response’ (Dean, 2005). Thus, while going against the grain of much existing feminist 
commentary, it should not be contentious to suggest that #MeToo may not have affected a great 
deal of change. As Serisier argues, the impetus to speak out contains a central paradox: 
‘Breaking the silence, despite its significant cultural impact, has not ended sexual violence, nor 
does it seem to have significantly reduced it, or to have eradicated the stigma associated with 
being a rape victim’ (2018: 12). This is not to deny the importance speaking out can have, 
especially as a mean of remaking the self in the aftermath of violence (Brison, 2002), but rather 
to acknowledge that it is a fraught endeavour, personally and politically. In naming ourselves as 
victims we may become for others in our entirety what we know ourselves to be only in part. 
Moreover, there is always the risk that in doing so we may inadvertently reify precisely the kinds 
of discourses that enable women’s victimisation in the first place (Gavey, 2005; Heberle, 1996; 
Marcus 1992). Following Lorde, we might also question the ethics of a strategy which places the 
burden of enlightenment on the oppressed rather than then the oppressor, not least in the face 
of ‘tremendous resistance’ (1984: 113). 
  
Thinking about #MeToo as an epistemic intervention obliquely but nevertheless insistently 
addressed to men brings questions of audibility and intelligibility to the fore. To address these 
questions means moving beyond a concern with visibility and voice, both of which have been 
central to feminist discussion to date. This is not because these issues are unimportant; of 
course they are critical. Even still, they can only take us so far when asked in isolation. By 
thinking about non-knowing — of who does not know, does not need to know and, indeed, needs 
not to know — we might gain new insight as to why sexual harassment and assault have proven 
so intractable. The analysis I have developed here suggests that, while identity and experience 
play a role, group interests are crucial. Quite simply, there is too much at stake. Despite the 
pains and opacities it may produce in their own lives, cis-het men benefit from not knowing how 
sexual harassment and assault shape women’s lives. Not knowing enables everyday interactions 
to progress untrammelled by painful truths; not knowing keeps the image of the happy family 
intact; not knowing allows manipulation and coercion to obtain under the guise of ‘romance’ 
and ‘seduction’; not knowing offsets uncertainty and offers a sense of moral uprightness; not 
knowing ensures a get-out clause even when the transgression is definite and deliberate; not 
knowing ensures forgiveness in the court of public opinion. Male ignorance is not incidental but 
interested; it has a purpose, even if this is not always apparent to those who inhabit it.  
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What does this analysis offer in practical terms? Admittedly, my interventions on this front are 
limited. Recognising how deeply rooted sexual harassment and assault are in male privilege and 
entitlement, and how this entitlement both proceeds from and depends upon not knowing the 
impact these practices have on women, does not in itself tell us what we as feminists can do 
about the problem. This, then, is a diagnosis without a prescription. Nevertheless, I want to offer 
some caveats to accompany the conceptualisation I have developed here which may prove useful 
in thinking about struggles against sexual violence. These might also apply when investigating 
other instances of male ignorance – for example, the cultivated if unconscious forms of non-
knowing that attend unequal divisions of domestic labour; the apparent obliviousness that 
sustains highly differentiated patterns of emotional engagement, affective provision and care 
work; the strategic inattentions, however unintended, that entrench gendered hierarchies across 
a range of organisational contexts and institutional settings.  
  
First, it is crucial to recognise that just because ignorance is the problem does not mean 
knowledge is its solution. Sedgwick attests to this when she cautions against ‘dwelling on the 
degree to which the power of our enemies over us is implicated, not in their command of 
knowledge, but precisely in their ignorance. The effect is a real one, but it carries dangers with it 
as well’ (1990: 7). To put it bluntly: some know very well what they do. Second, it is important to 
bear in mind that knowledge does not necessarily make a difference. After all, it is perfectly 
possible to know but not care, or not care enough, especially when power and privilege are at 
stake. In order to effect change, knowledge needs to be transformative rather than simply 
corrective or assimilative. As Sandra Lee Bartky argues with regard anti-racism, what is needed 
is ‘a form of knowing that transforms the self who knows, a knowing that brings new 
sympathies, new affects as well as new cognitions and new forms of intersubjectivity’ (1996, 179, 
cited in Pedwell, 2012: 164). It is this kind of affectively charged and ethically compelling 
knowing that is so crucial to dismantling relations of domination and oppression, and yet so 
difficult to produce and sustain. Third, it must be remembered that the most direct means of 
addressing a problem will not necessarily be the most effective and, indeed, a ‘head on’ approach 
may be detrimental at times. In relation to sexual violence, this means accepting that ‘[a]n 
effective strategy against rape must aim for more than the eradication of rape – or even of 
sexism – alone’ (Davis, 1982: 201). Fourth, we should not underestimate the purchase of 
imagination in advancing feminist horizons. With regard sexual harassment and assault, this 
means rethinking the primacy accorded to speaking out in what seems an increasingly desperate 
attempt to impress knowledge and thereby impose ethical relationality. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the continued exhortation for women to share their ‘stories’ — these ‘stories’ 
necessarily being tales of degradation and violation – by now amounts to a kind of gaslighting, 
as several decades of painful outpour has done little to stem the problem at its source. Rather 
than continually expose our injuries, we could instead direct our energies towards narrating ‘the 
world as we might desire it to be, a story in which we no longer need to tell the same stories of 
sexual violence’ (Serisier, 2018: 215). In this way we might counter the fatalism that so often 
surrounds sexual violation (Alcoff, 2018), based in the recognition that this is not and never was 
inevitable.  
 
All this suggests that it is necessary to think a good deal more about what it is that enables so 
many men to propagate sexual harassment and assault in the first place. While understanding 
the structural underpinnings and institutional arrangements that support such practices is 
crucial, so too must we examine the cognitive blockages and emotional partitions that pattern 
their perpetration. My contention is that male ignorance plays a crucial role in this regard, not 
only by facilitating widespread inattention to the problem, but also by inculcating the 
disposition needed to undertake these acts. As an ideological formation, male ignorance is 
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not fixed or immutable, but must instead be continually re-secured in the course of everyday 
life. Recognising this, a strategic task for feminists might be to decipher precisely how it is 
inculcated – in what times and places, by what means and mechanisms – and to scrutinise those 
instances in which it becomes obstructed, curtailed or otherwise compromised. In this way, we 
may learn how to instigate and accelerate these processes, such that the generalised yet 




1 As Jack Halberstam (2017) notes in relation to the USA, the overwhelming focus on women as victims 
and men as perpetrators has been accompanied by a resounding lack of attention to heterosexuality 
within popular commentary and media coverage of #MeToo.  
2 It is worth pointing out here that intersections are always located. In many contexts, the formulation of 
‘white ignorance’ as a specific kind of racialised non-knowing simply will not apply, or will not apply in 
the same way, as different histories give rise to different forms of structured non-knowing. As such, while 
the manner in which white and male ignorance intersect represents a germane line of enquiry in contexts 
such as North America and Europe, in others it will not. 
3 Kortney Ziegler provides insight on this as a black trans man reflecting on his ‘newfound privilege’: ‘One 
of the most obvious ways in which I benefit from male privilege is the reduction of public sexual assault 
from other men. When I walk down the street in this body, I can do so without the fear I once held as a 
victim of male harassment’ (2017: 210). Highlighting the intersectional workings of such privilege, he goes 
on to note: ‘Although I’m less likely to be sexually assaulted because of the ways I present my gender, this 
privilege is in exchange for becoming a visible target of racist practices designed to police young black 
manhood’ (Ziegler, 2017: 210). Of course, this is not to say that trans people are less vulnerable to sexual 
or intimate violence, as research readily attests (Peitzmeier et al., 2020). 
4 Here we begin to see why it is necessary to examine rather than assume the intersectional workings of 
male ignorance in relation to specific instances of not knowing. Precisely because the threat of sexual 
violence is so often displaced onto male ‘Others’ – which, depending on context, may include Black or 
brown men, low caste men, immigrant men, religious minority men, and so forth – multiple axes of social 
power all shape whether and how men come to know about sexual harassment and assault. However, this 
does not necessarily play out in uniform ways, such that we can readily assume that men who are in some 
way marginalised necessarily know more readily than others. In some instances, subordination along 
lines other than gender may incentivise men to not know all the more concertedly. This may apply in a 
delimited fashion, for example in relation to women from one’s own community, as Crenshaw’s (1991) 
analysis attests. This, in turn, can give rise to racialised silences around sexual violence that have wide-
ranging implications, as Moffett’s (2006) consideration of the South African context demonstrates. 
Alternatively, it may be that men onto whom the spectre of sexual violence is most often projected cannot 
afford to not know about sexual violence, perhaps especially in relation to women outside their own social 
grouping. Conversely, for men who enjoy multiple forms of social protection and privilege, not knowing 
may come especially readily, as they are rarely forced to confront images or assumptions about 
themselves as potential perpetrators. Among such men, knowing about sexual harassment and assault 
may again be delimited, pertaining only in relation to women they understand as being ‘like them’ or, 
even more narrowly, women or girls they perceive as being ‘theirs’, such as daughters, sisters and wives. 
Ultimately, these represent empirical questions, deserving of further attention.  
5 Medina alights on a particularly salient example of close-mindedness when he describes ‘the sexist man 
who systematically undermines the epistemic authority of women, gives them no credibility and 
pathologizes their perception, reasoning, and testimony (depicting them as irrational or hysterical, for 
example)’ (2015: 35). Taking this point further, he suggests that close-mindedness can be more narrowly 
circumscribed, applying not simply to women in general but rather to a particular set of experiences, ‘such 
as the suffering of victims of date rape’ (Medina, 2015: 35). As my argument heretofore suggests, however, 
I see no reason to presume such close-mindedness is limited to the ‘sexist man’ (assuming he could be 
readily identified). Rather, and as Miranda Fricker’s work suggests (2007), in a sexist society women’s 
credibility is diminished generally, rather than only in the minds of avowed sexists. At the same time this 
credibility deficit is not evenly apportioned, as some women are deemed more credible than others.  
6 This is not to say that racist oppression past and present is without intimate dimensions. As Angela 
Davis points out in the context of the USA, ‘One of racism’s salient historical features has always been the 
assumption that white men – especially those who wield economic power – possess an incontestable right 
of access to Black women’s bodies’ (1982: 175). Through the institution of slavery, which involved all 
manner of ‘monstrous intimacies’ (Sharpe, 2010), white and male ignorance combined in an especially 
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